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*  Hon. Louis H. Pollak, Senior Judge, United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by
designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
No. 06-1983
            
TIMOTHY HART,
                                     Appellant,
    v.
TOWNSHIP OF HILLSIDE; HILLSIDE FIRE DEPT;
CHRISTOPHER ALFANO; FRANK W. CASWELL, SR.;
KAREN MCCOY-OLIVER,
            
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 03-cv-05841)
District Judge: Honorable Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr. 
            
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 9, 2007
Before: SLOVITER and AMBRO, Circuit Judges, and POLLAK,* District Judge
         
 OPINION
____
POLLAK, District Judge.
1 The NJ DOP “certificate of eligibles” ranked candidates
that were considered eligible for the position on the basis of their
written and physical exams.  The Hillside Fire Department was free
to determine which of the candidates were preferred based on their
own criteria, such as a psychological evaluation or criminal history
check.  Indeed, some candidates listed as eligible on the NJ DOP
list were later removed from the list because, upon evaluation by
the Hillside Fire Department, it was determined that they were
actually not eligible.
2
 Timothy Hart appeals the grant of summary judgment against him arising from
his non-selection as a firefighter with the Hillside Fire Department.  The District of New
Jersey exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 38 U.S.C. § 4323(b)(3); and 28
U.S.C. § 1367.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. §
1367.  For the reasons explained herein, we affirm.
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, we discuss only those facts necessary
to our decision.  On November 1, 2001, the Hillside Township Clerk wrote the New
Jersey Department of Personnel (NJ DOP) to ask for a certificate of eligible candidates1
for the position of firefighter in Hillside.  In December 2001, Hart submitted his
application for employment as a firefighter with the Hillside Fire Department.  At the
time, he was a member of the New Jersey Army National Guard, but did not provide any
information on his application concerning his current military obligation.
In March 2002, Hart was invited to interview with the fire department.  At the
interview, he mentioned that he was a member of the National Guard, prompting at least
2 On April 22, 2002, then-Fire Chief Frank Caswell issued
a memorandum to the mayor explaining the recommendation of the
Firefighter Selection Committee.  This memorandum included an
identical preference list of the candidates, and explained how the
preference list was compiled after a review of “their application
submittals, background checks, criminal history check, medical
evaluation, drug testing[,] and psychological results.”  A176.  With
regard to Hart, the memorandum noted: “One final candidate, Mr.
Timothy Hart, who has finished sixth in the process due to his
interview and  background check, is not recommended for hiring
at this time.  He shall remain on the list for future consideration.”
Id.
3
thirteen questions about his military obligation.  Following his interview, Hart submitted
to a psychological evaluation, which was the next step in the hiring process.
On April 19, 2002, the Firefighter Selection Committee submitted a memorandum
ranking the preferred eligible candidates for the firefighter position.  The list read as
follows:
1. Louis Whitaker
2. Michael Moran
3. Christopher Alfano
4. John Kozar
5. Jeffrey Barron
6. Timothy Hart
A171.  Hart was listed sixth in the list of six candidates.2  On May 13, 2002, Hillside
hired two new firefighters, Louis Whitaker and Michael Moran, who were listed as the
first and second choices on the Firefighter Selection Committee’s list of candidates.
On May 15, 2002, the Firefighter Selection Committee issued an additional
memorandum listing in the preferred order those candidates recommended for the
3 This list mirrors the memorandum of April 19, 2002,
except that Jonathan Kozar was removed from consideration
because it was determined that he had falsified information on his
application.  See A180.
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firefighter position in the event that Hillside decided to hire a third new firefighter.  This
list was:
1. Christopher Alfano
2. Jeffrey Baron
3. Timothy Hart
A180.3  Based on this list, Hillside hired Christopher Alfano, effective February 24,
2003.
On September 11, 2003, Plaintiff filed an appeal of his non-selection with the NJ
DOP, contending that he was bypassed for selection because of his membership in the
National Guard.  On March 12, 2004, the NJ DOP issued a Final Administrative Action
of the Merit System Board, explaining that “the appointing authority did not treat the
appellant differently than the other applications” and that “there is no violation of any
Merit System law or rules.”  A241.
On December 5, 2003, prior to receiving the NJ DOP’s decision, Hart filed a four-
count complaint in the District Court for the District of New Jersey, contending that he
was bypassed for the Hillside firefighter position because of his membership in the
National Guard, in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
Rights Act (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. § 4311 et seq., and the New Jersey Law Against
4 Plaintiff additionally alleged a claim under the Open
Records Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. 47:1A:1 et seq., and a claim for
slander, but those were dismissed pursuant to a stipulation between
the parties on February 27, 2006. 
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Discrimination (NJ LAD), N.J. Stat. Ann. 10:5-1 et seq.4  Both parties filed motions for
summary judgment on June 10, 2005.  
On March 17, 2006, the District Court granted defendants’ motion for summary
judgment.  This appeal followed.
II.
Plaintiff appeals the grant of summary judgment against him on both the
USERRA claim and the NJ LAD claim.  We will address each in turn.  Our standard of
review of a grant of summary judgment is plenary.  Gottshall v. Consol. Rail Corp., 56
F.3d 530, 533 (3d Cir. 1995).  Summary judgment is only appropriate if there are no
genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  In reviewing the District Court’s grant of summary judgment, we
view the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and draw all reasonable
inferences in his favor.  Gottshall, 56 F.3d at 533.
A. 
Under the USERRA, “A person who is a member of . . . a uniformed service shall
not be denied initial employment . . . by an employer on the basis of that
membership . . . .”  38 U.S.C. § 4311(a).  To establish a claim under the USERRA, the
plaintiff has the initial burden of production to show that, by a preponderance of the
5 Defendants contends that Hart used the word “gook”
during his interview, but Hart claims that this never happened.
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evidence, “the employee’s military service was ‘a substantial or motivating factor’” in
the adverse employment decision.  See Sheehan v. Dep’t of the Navy, 240 F.3d 1009,
1013 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  “If this requirement is met, the employer then has the opportunity
to come forward with evidence to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
employer would have taken the adverse action anyway, for a valid reason.”  Id.  The
statute is explicit that the defendant carries the burden of persuasion once plaintiff has
made his/her initial showing that military service was “a substantial or motivating
factor.”  See 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c) (“An employer shall be considered to have engaged in
actions prohibited—(1) . . . if the person’s membership . . . in the uniformed services is a
motivating factor in the employer’s action, unless the employer can prove that the action
would have been taken in the absence of such membership . . . .”).
In the case at bar, we will assume without deciding that Hart met his prima facie
burden of showing that his membership in the National Guard was “a substantial or
motivating factor” in his non-selection as a firefighter in Hillside Township.  See
Sheehan, 240 F.3d at 1013.  The burdens of production and persuasion then shift to the
defendants to show that the same action would have been taken anyway.  Id.  Here, the
defendants provided multiple legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for Hart’s non-
selection.  As the record shows:
1. Hart seemed to take the interview too casually;5
When considering summary judgment, we draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and therefore will not
include Hart’s alleged racial slur as a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for his non-selection.
6  Defendant further contends that his USERRA claim must
be heard by a jury because there exist disputes of material fact.
Because we find that defendants are entitled to summary judgment
as a matter of law, even when all factual inferences are drawn in
favor of the plaintiff, we conclude that this matter need not go
before a jury.
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2. Hart was inappropriately dressed at the interview;
3. Hart has a criminal history, including an incident with a BB gun and a
disorderly persons offense related to an incident with his girlfriend;
4. Hart has a subpar driving record, including three moving violations and four
accidents;
5. Hart’s psychological evaluation suggested that he was immature.
Hart has put forth no evidence that would dispute any of the above contentions,
all of which constitute legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for Hart’s non-selection. 
Accordingly, we must affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on Hart’s
USERRA claim.6
B.
Hart contends that the district court applied the wrong burden-shifting framework
to his NJ LAD claim.  To this we will now turn.
The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJ LAD) prohibits an employer
from discriminating against an employee or prospective employee “because of the
8liability for service in the Armed Forces of the United States.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. 10:5-
12(a).  When analyzing cases under the NJ LAD, courts look to the closest analogous
federal statute and adopt its evidentiary framework.  See Grigoletti v. Ortho Pharm.
Corp., 570 A.2d 903, 906–07 (N.J. 1990) (“The substantive and procedural standards
that we have developed under the State’s LAD have been markedly influenced by the
federal experience.”).  In the employment-discrimination context, New Jersey courts
typically look to federal law and employ the burden-shifting framework set forth in
McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  See Lawrence v. Nat’l Westminster
Bank, 98 F.3d 61, 65 (3d Cir. 1996).  “However, the Court has never embraced the
McDonnell Douglas test literally, invariably, or inflexibly.”  Grigoletti, 570 A.2d at 907. 
Rather, New Jersey courts recognize that the McDonnell Douglas framework “provide[s]
only a general framework for analyzing unlawful discrimination claims and must be
modified where appropriate.”  Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan, 569 A.2d 793, 799 (N.J.
1990).  Thus, New Jersey courts “have not hesitated to depart from the McDonnell
Douglas methodology if a rigid application of its standards is inappropriate under the
circumstances.”  Grigoletti, 570 A.2d at 912.  
In situations where McDonnell Douglas does not fit the circumstances of the case,
New Jersey courts borrow standards from other federal employment discriminations
statutes that better fit the needs of the claims being raised under the NJ LAD.  See, e.g.,
Anderson v. Exxon Co., 446 A.2d 486, 495 n.6 (N.J. 1982) (“Our decision . . . comports
with a similar shifting of the burden of proof of affirmative defenses to the employer in
9suits brought in federal courts under the Equal Pay Act. . . . as compared with litigation
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.) in which the
burden remains on the plaintiff.”); Brosshard v. Hackensack Univ. Medical Cntr., 783
A.2d 731, 738 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (“[W]e take this opportunity to
incorporate the philosophy of sections 12114 and 12210 of the [Americans with
Disabilities Act] into the LAD.”).
The federal statutory analog to Hart’s NJ LAD claim is the USERRA. 
Accordingly, we agree with Hart that, in addressing his NJ LAD claim, the District Court
should have employed USERRA’s burden-shifting framework, as enunciated in
Sheehan, rather than the McDonnell Douglas framework.  See Sheehan, 240 F.3d at
1012.  As noted above, the key difference between the Sheehan and McDonnell Douglas
frameworks is that, under Sheehan, once the plaintiff has established his/her prima facie
case, the burdens of production and persuasion shift to the defendants to prove that the
adverse employment action would have been taken despite the plaintiff’s protected
status.  Id. at 1013. 
However, while we find that the District Court should have applied the USERRA
burden-shifting framework (as explained in Sheehan) to Hart’s NJ LAD claim, rather
than the McDonnell Douglas framework, we also find that, under the correct Sheehan
standard, defendants are entitled to summary judgment.  We applied the Sheehan burden-
shifting framework to Hart’s USERRA claim, supra, and affirmed the grant of summary
judgment to the defendants.  Analyzing Hart’s NJ LAD claim under the USERRA
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framework yields the same result.
III.
For the reasons explained above, we will affirm.
